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Abstract: This paper addresses economic methodology, focusing particularly 
on Caplan’s (2003) probabilistic analysis and the problems therewith. The argument 
launched against Caplan is based on the fact that the said author either violates the 
rule of self-reference (his methodological statement) rule does not obey the standard it 
sets itself to judge the lower-level propositions of economics) or if it does not, Caplan 
is inevitably in the epistemic dark as to the probability of lower-level propositions. In 
the meantime, we will make an attempt at the exegesis of what Caplan may possibly 
mean by the notion of probability. Finally, it will be demonstrated that the criticism 
directed at Caplan does not apply to the methodology employed by Austrian 
economics.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper is a continuation of the methodological debate launched by Caplan 
and continued by him and his Austrian critics Block and Hulsmann.1 It mainly 
concerns the synthetic apriori, which the Austrians support and Caplan’s criticism of 
this doctrine, based on the probability considerations he offers. In section 2 we probe 
the requirement of self-reference. Section 3 is given over to a focus on the self-
reference criterion applied to Caplan’s probability analysis. In section 4 we make an 
exegetical attempt of the Caplanian notion of probability, and in section 5 we ask if 
Austrianism itself passes muster under the stringent conditions to which we have 
subjected Caplan’s thesis. The burden of section 6 is to demonstrate that the overall 
prospects for the Caplanian methodological paradigm are bleak. It does not even 
allow Caplan to make a distinction between purely analytical truth and only 
adventitiously true empirical statements. 
 
2. The requirement of self-reference 
The touchstone we are going to employ in this paper when judging the 
respective methodological positions is whether a given methodological statement 
obeys the principle of self-reference, that is whether the rule itself conforms to the 
standard it applies to other propositions (in this case, first-order propositions 
constituting the body of a given science or scholarship). Technically speaking, if a 
meta-statement uses a universal quantifier (of the form “everything is P”, where P is 
                                                          
1 Block, 1999, 2003, 2005, 2007; Caplan, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003; Hulsmann, 1999 
Igor Wysocki, Walter E. Block  2 
 
E-Journal “Dialogue”, 3, 2017 
some predicate), the rule itself must fall under its sway. That is, if the meta-statement 
says that everything is P, then this very rule should apply its standard to itself; so that 
it must be true that the meta-statement is P too.  
To illustrate the point, there is a famous refutation of the methodological view 
of logical positivists delivered by Hans-Hermann Hoppe (1995). Logical positivists 
maintained that the truth of propositions derives only from two sources. They are 
either contingently true (the reality happened to be such-and-such, in which case they 
are synthetic a posteriori true statements, that is ones whose truth is not necessary but 
adventitious; or, in other words, because facts turned out to be such-and-such). For 
example, it is now raining, or, that girl is wearing a red blouse.  The alternative is that 
they are true by definition (in which case they are analytical a priori true statements, 
that is ones that do not extend our knowledge; they merely indicate how we have 
chosen to use words). For example, bachelors are unmarried men, or “elephant” refers 
to that big animal with the funny looking nose. To summarize: for the logical 
positivists, there are only two types of states. First, empirical ones that are falsifiable, 
and not only apply to the real world but also tell us about it. Second, there are 
tautologies, which are necessarily true, non-falsifiable, but do not describe the state of 
the world; they only indicate how language works. There is no such thing as a 
synthetic apriori statement, one which is necessarily true, non-falsifiable, but, yet, 
nevertheless, applies to reality.2  
Now Hoppe asks the critical question, alluding to the self-reference problem: 
what is the status of this very methodological rule? If it is true, it must fall into either 
of these two categories – either it is contingently (empirically) true or merely 
analytically correct (that is, by virtue of the very words involved in its formulation). If 
the former is the case, there is nothing necessary about its truth. Sometimes it may be 
true, on other occasions, false. The only way to distinguish the one case from the 
other is by empirical examination. The logical positivists’ position and its truth would 
thus have to be verified by checking it against reality. Therefore if it is true, it is only 
tentatively so. In a future experiment, it may always be falsified. After all, according 
to the scrutinized methodological rule, whatever is synthetic is empirical and these 
types of claims are at least in principle falsifiable.  
But this will not at all suffice for the logical positivists. They see this 
alternative as the very bedrock of their philosophy. It has attained, at least for them, 
the status of the synthetic apriori, something they presumably reject out of hand. In 
other words, their philosophy is built on a foundation of quicksand. They cannot be 
satisfied with the merely empirical status of their “either-or” position.3 They cannot be 
allowed to have their cake and eat it too. They are logically compelled to renounce 
one of their foundational principles. Either they must admit that there can be such a 
thing as a synthetic apriori statement – something necessarily true, and also pertaining 
to the real world – or they need to acknowledge that the “either-or” claim is false.  
If on the other hand, that methodological statement is analytical, then it is 
merely vacuously and definitionally true; and hence, it cannot extend our knowledge 
at all; rather, the statement instructs us only about a terminological convention. In the 
latter case, it is needless to say that we should care not a whit about it. Any 
                                                          
2 A unique characteristic of Austrian economics is that such proclamations do indeed exist. For 
example, whenever voluntary trade occurs, both parties necessarily gain in the ex ante sense; each 
partner to such barter, values what he receives more than what he yields.  
3 All statement are either analytic and thus mere tautologies, or, are empirical, and thus sometimes 
false. 
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methodological rule that is reducible to purely analytical truth does not merit the 
former label in the first place.  
Let us conclude this section. The challenge of self-reference leaves logical 
positivists puzzled.4 If they stick to their methodological rule and self-reference 
constraint, they have to conclude either of the two, neither of which they would 
willingly accept for it either makes their meta-rule contingent (empirical and therefore 
subject to falsification) or empty (because its truth is derived from the stipulative 
definition, in which case the rule starts to resemble the wordplay and ceases to refer to 
reality).  
There is apparently one saving grace when it comes to evading the principle of 
self-reference. When a given statement makes use of the universal quantifier, it may 
be said that the quantifier “every” employed in that very statement does not range 
over the statement itself. For example, the liar’s paradox. When Smith claims that 
everybody is a liar (technically speaking, for every x, x a person, x is a liar), the only 
way to evade the famous liar’s paradox is to say that Smith’s pronouncement is of a 
different logical type and thus Smith is not another person who the quantifier “every” 
ranges over. Therefore, Smith could effectively maintain that everybody is a liar but 
him and thus his statement is rendered logically coherent (See Russell, 1968). Yet, we 
deem such an attempt as ad hoc and desperately designed just to evade the problem it 
really faces.5  
 
3. Self-reference criterion applied to Caplan’s probability  
Let us gauge Caplan’s (2003)6 position using our touchstone of self-reference. 
First, when Caplan says that “everything is probability” (…), he should bite the bullet 
and admit that the quantifier “everything” must also range over the rule itself. 
Therefore, he must concede that his everything-is-probability7 statement is also only 
probabilistically true (its certainty can also be measured on the continuous scale from 
0 up to 100% providing it is in terms of certainty that Caplan understands probability). 
If he does so, he is true to the standard of self-reference and yet, another problem 
looms large. How is he to determine the probability of any of first-order economic 
propositions? We posit that he must discount their respective probabilities by the 
probability of his meta-statement.  
Therefore, taking into account the above, the probability of any first-order 
proposition is Pp x Pms, where Pp stands for the probability of a stand alone economic 
proposition and Pms is the probability of Caplan’s methodological statement. 
The question might arise why we discount the probability using the algebraic 
operation of a product. We do not take any firm stand on it, though. The whole point 
                                                          
4 That is one way of putting the matter. Another, perhaps more correct but less polite, would be 
“intellectually annihilated.”  
5 At this point we put ourselves in a good company for Russell’s type-theory “solution” was 
subsequently demolished by Wittgenstein (1961).  
6 Unless otherwise specified, all references to this author’s contribution will refer to this one article of 
his. 
7 This all-embracing relativism reminds us of the following passage from Ayn Rand. Rand (1957, p. 
248). She has James Taggert, one of her villains, stating: “There are no absolutes – as Dr. Pritchett 
(another of her villains) has proved irrefutably. Nothing is absolute. Everything is a matter of opinion.”  
Caplan would fit in well in Rand’s lexicon of villains, with but a slight emendation. Thus, we now say: 
“There are no absolutes – as Dr. Caplan has proved irrefutably. Nothing is absolute. Everything is a 
matter of opinion. We cannot assign a probability of 0 or 1 to anything; to any claim, whether 
tautology, empirical, or synthetic apriori. All (meaningful) statements have a trust value lying 
somewhere in between these two extremes.” 
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is that whatever the operation is, the probability of the first-order proposition must be 
discounted by the probability of Caplan’s meta-statement in some way or other.  Both 
must always be a fraction, falling somewhere in between zero and one, but cannot 
take on the value of either. If this author insists that either can take on the value of 1, 
then he would be willy-nilly advocating  the Austrian belief in apodictically true and 
100% certain claims. This, he is precluding from doing, lest he give up on his entire 
position. 
Second, the probability is 1 only in the extreme case; that would render Caplan 
vulnerable to all possible values ranging between zero and one, with 1 being reserved 
for certainly or apodictically true claims, which apply only to synthetic priori 
statements. Why do we simply multiply the probability of any first-order economic 
proposition by the probability of the Caplanian meta-statement? This is because it 
might be plausibly believed that the former is dependent from the latter, and we want 
to obviate that assumption. The analogy would be the chance of leaving home and 
winning a jackpot. If and only if leaving home and winning a jackpot are logically 
independent8, the probability of a complex event of leaving home and winning a 
jackpot is the probability of the former multiplied by the probability of the latter. That 
is a structural analogy of Caplan’s predicament. In other words, even if Caplan is 
quite certain about the truth of a given proposition, he must also reckon with the fact 
that its probability should necessarily be discounted due to the inescapably 
probabilistic nature of his second-order statement. 
 
4. What lies behind the Caplanian notion of probability – an exegetical 
attempt 
Caplan is not entirely explicit on the concept of probability but we may 
venture some interpretations as to how he conceives of probability and whether any of 
these possible interpretations can be of any help to the author. First, he may 
understand probability psychologically, that is as a function of the certainty9 which we 
attach to a given proposition. Let us first try construing Caplan as holding this 
psychological account of probability.  
Given that Caplan is a die-hard indifferentist,10 we can even suggest an 
“exact” measure for this  psychologically conceived probability. Before doing so, let 
us specify what the applied symbols denote: 
outcome X – it rains next day 
outcome Y – it is sunny next day 
outcome C – there is a plane crash in the vicinity of 100 miles in two days 
outcome D – there is a terrorist attack anywhere in two days 
Cprob – probability of the event C 
Dpro – probability of the event D 
r1 – the financial reward person B offers if C occurs  
r2 – the financial reward person B offers if D occurs 
Let us imagine that a person A is offered two fancy unilateral contracts by a 
person B, the latter being a devil-may-care altruist11: if  outcome X occurs, B will pay 
A $60, if Y occurs then B will proffer only $4012  
                                                          
8 As they usually are, and, as we posit in this case 
9 Or lack of confidence for that matter 
10 See on this matter the following Barnett, 2003; Block, 1980, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2009A, 2009B, 
Block and Barnett, 2010; Caplan, undated, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2008; Hoppe, 2005, 2009; Hudik, 
unpublished; Hulsmann, 1999; Machaj, 2007; Nozick, 1977; O’Neill, 2010. 
11 With apologies to Ayn Rand 
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If A is indifferent between the two options, he necessarily attributes such 
probabilities to these two outcomes that the ratio of which is the inverse of the ratio of 
offered payments, that is he necessarily believes that outcome Y is 3/2 times as 
probable as the other one, that is the probabilities are Y – 60% and X – 40%.  
Trivially, in much the same manner as we can infer the expected ratio of 
probabilities given indifference and the ratio of promised rewards, we can deduce the 
ratio of expected probabilities by imagining such a ratio of rewards at which a person 
is indifferent between the two outcomes. So, let us imagine yet another offer made by 
person A. Now he presents us with two options: there are two unilateral contracts 
available, and B can sign only one. The respective financial rewards (r1 and r2) are 
offered by our benefactor B for respective outcomes (C and D). If the Caplananian 
introspectivist indifferentist wants to find out what are the expected probabilities of 
outcomes C and D, the only thing he needs to consider is at what rewards for 
respective outcomes he would be indifferent between signing either of the two 
contracts. The relevant formula is now: 
r1 × Cprob= r2 ×Dprob, or equivalently 
r1
𝑟2
 = 
𝐷 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏
𝐶 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏
 
As can be seen from the second equation the ratio of probabilities inversely 
reflects the ratio of rewards. Then again, to determine what are the expected 
probabilities, Caplan would have to introspectively judge at what ratio of rewards he 
would be indifferent between the two outcomes (and effectively: between signing 
either of the two contracts). 
Trivially, our analysis can be extended to real bets, that is to possible gains and 
losses. So, if persons A and B are now gamblers having a bet and outcome C would 
now bring a loss to B, and D a gain (here expressed by a positive number), then the 
psychologically estimated probabilities are reflected in such a ratio between possible 
gains and losses that we are indifferent between betting and not betting at all. Now to 
find the probabilities (assuming again that one either gains or loses), we have to solve 
the following two equations: 
1) D × Dpro – C × Cprob = 0 the expected value should be null for it would 
make a person indifferent between betting and not betting at all) 
2) Cprob + Dpro = 100%  
And finally, in general terms, if Caplan sticks to a psychological account, then 
trying  to find out what are the probabilities of, say, minimum-wage law and ex-ante 
mutual gains from trade, he would be well-advised  to stick to the following 
instructions: determine what money he should bet on respective laws so as to be 
indifferent between the two. Take the ratio between the two and invert it and you 
arrive at the ratio of the two probabilities.13 On the face of it, this all sounds like a 
mockery but far from it – it constitutes a powerful a reduction ad absurdum. 
Conceiving of probabilities in psychological terms in the sanctified area of economics 
has exactly this grotesque flavor to it. So let us try some other interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 We assume for the sake of simplicity that A and B both cover the whole logical space of possibilities 
at a given moment and are mutually disjunctive, that is only one contract will necessarily come into 
effect.  
13 One caveat seems to be in order here. We do not believe, unlike Caplan, that this apparent 
indifference can be ever demonstrated in action. Instead we would relegate the concept to the domain 
of psychology. This aside section is meant to somehow charitably interpret Caplanian notion of 
probability.  
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Is Caplanian probability equivalent to Austrian14 class probability? It would be 
quite a stretch to conclude the two are on an equal footing? Why? The latter is 
concerned with repetitive random non-unique events and it tests the occurrence of a 
given attribute in a series of potentially infinite homogenous series. In contrast, 
economics by nature is not about repetitive random events. It is by definitional about 
purposeful human behaviour. So, alas, Caplan qua economist is necessarily deprived 
of this truly scientific concept of probability.  
Our final attempt is to conceive of Caplanian probability of first-order 
economic propositions as epistemic probability. This bears at least some resemblance 
to Popperian (1959) level of corroboration. Here, a given hypothesis is the more 
probable the greater number of tests (aiming at falsifying the said hypothesis) it 
undergoes; or (as verificationists would have it) the more evidence confirms the 
hypothesis. But if such a notion of probability is employed, the entire enterprise is that 
of logical positivism15 and so the test of self-reference returns with a vengeance. After 
all, it should be borne in mind that both verificationism and falsificationism maintain 
that statements can be true two-fold. If they are a priori, they must be analytically 
true. If, on the other hand, they are synthetically true, they are a posteriori. There is 
no room at all for synthetic a priori statements in this paradigm. Yet, our touchstone 
of self-reference wreaks havoc again by posing the same question and leaving this 
very model vulnerable to a perennial problem: what is the epistemic status of the 
above-mentioned methodological “either or” rule? Furthermore, interpreting 
Caplanian probability as epistemic probability has another rather unwelcome side 
effect. For although, however outlandish it may sound, we can imagine that evidence 
“verifies” economic laws; by no stretch of imagination can we imagine any evidence 
corroborating Caplan’s everything-is-probability meta-statement. By what possible 
empirical means can he even try to measure its probability?  That is truly beyond any 
rationality. Epistemic interpretation of Caplan’s probability fails on the grounds that it 
does not apply a uniform criterion; when it comes to first-order economic 
propositions, evidence confirming the law may account for its probability16; no 
empirical evidence can raise or lower the probability of Caplan’s meta-statement.  
 
5. Does Austrianism pass muster? 
Does Austrian economics pass our self-reference test successfully?  We would 
not have a successful thesis were this not so. Our view would then be subject to the 
criticism that we ask of Caplan, and criticize him for not offering, what we ourselves 
cannot supply. Happily, the answer is ‘yes’. First of all, praxeology is purely 
deductive. It starts with an undeniable action axiom; it affirms that humans act (at 
least sometimes). If the statement were to be assailed argumentatively, one would be 
caught in performative inconsistency, that is there would be a glaring contradiction 
between the content of one’s argument (humans do not act) and the very fact that one 
                                                          
14 Crovelli, 2009, 2010, 2011; Hoppe, 1995, 1997, 2007; Mises, R., 1981; Mises, L., 1998; Rothbard, 
1962, 2010. 
15 Something explicitly renounced by Caplan (2003). 
16 Not surprisingly we do not share the view that it is evidence that verifies economic laws. We are 
rather inclined to interpret the evidence through the lenses of apodictic economic laws. What is more, 
we firmly believe that e.g. minimum-wage law would hold despite the lack of any evidence; nay, it 
even holds in the world of no wages. It is because the said law is conditional: if the minimum wage is 
artificially increased, then marginal workers become sub-marginal workers, which is nothing else but 
the rise of unemployment. Austrians would recognize this truth even if there has been no evidence 
whatsoever of the effects of raising the minimum-wage.   
Igor Wysocki, Walter E. Block  7 
 
E-Journal “Dialogue”, 3, 2017 
has made an argument in the first place (argument being obviously an instance of 
action). That is to say, the very act of denying human action is itself an act. 
That is why the action axiom has this character of an axiom. Its truth cannot be 
denied without violating logic. And this is the only proper point of departure for the 
entire field of economics, the project being so brilliantly illuminated by Mises (1998). 
It follows inexorably that whatever is logically deduced from an apodictically true 
axiom is necessarily true itself.17 The problem of discounting the probability of 
economic propositions does not even apply here. The whole edifice of Austrian 
economics is simply pervaded by probability 1; so, there is simply no room for any 
ranging within 0 and 1. 
 
6. Let us attempt to demonstrate how truly radical and illogical is 
Caplan’s position in a different way. Above, we mentioned the synthetic apriori 
claim that when voluntary trade takes place each party must expect to have his 
welfare position improved thereby. If Caplan is to stick to his (intellectual) guns, he 
must acquiesce in the notion that while such a claim is probably true, it is not 
necessarily the case. Suppose A gives an apple to B in return for a banana. The 
Austrian view on this is clear. If this is a case of voluntary barter, A values the banana 
he receives more than the apple he gives up, and B ranks these goods in the opposite 
order. But suppose neither is true. That is, A really likes his apple more than the 
banana he receives, he just wants to get on the good side of B by making this trade; he 
thinks that will butter up B for other purposes. Would that improbable scenario serve 
to save Caplan’s bacon? Not at all. For, the Austrian insight is that there is something 
about the banana he imports that A favors more than the apple he exports. It need not 
be the quality of the fruit. His motive could be the very one we are considering.  We 
offer this challenge to Caplan: show us why the Austrian analysis does not have a 
probability of 1, to put this matter in Caplanesque language. Namely, it is necessarily 
true. 
If we take Caplanania to its logical conclusion, he would deny that the 
assertions “ten is a higher number than nine” or “two plus two equals four” have a 
probability of 1; that is, that they are necessarily and apodictically true. Yes, yes, we 
all know about Descartes (1901) and his claim that we are all now dreaming. 
Modesty, after all, does become us. The present authors do not wish to take issue with 
this philosopher.  We only maintain that it is important to distinguish empirical claims 
such as “it is now raining” from those mentioned in this paragraph which belong in 
the realm of pure logic. Caplan’s theoretical construct does not allow him to even 
make such primordial distinctions. As far as economics is concerned, yes, we might 
all be dreaming. But this would not obviate the distinction rejected by Caplan. 
Incidentally, even “dreaming” cannot really work against our position for we interpret 
economic laws as holding objectively and universally, albeit conditionally.18 
                                                          
17 It might be objected that Austrian economics sometimes employs empirical premises rather than 
limiting itself, purely, to those that are a priori. E.g. Misesian disutility of labour and the positive value 
of leisure. Whether these are truly contingent (that is, they might be otherwise) or they simply stem 
from the nature of humans as they are at this stage of evolutionary development is of little importance 
here. The fact is that these are fairly uncontroversial and one would be inclined to assign probability 1 
to them. Moreover, praxeology can do quite well, thank you, without these assumptions. They do not at 
all besmirch the Austrian project; rather, they apply it to the real world in which they fully, albeit not 
necessarily, obtain. 
18 Let us fully reveal our hand. In fact, our view on economics is akin to our view on logic. Logic is 
true in all possible worlds. 2+2 is necessarily equal to 4 although there are such possible worlds in 
which there are no discreet entities and therefore there is nothing to count. In a possible world in which 
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Let us attempt to employ Descartes in a different way in criticizing Caplan. 
Who says that there is a probability of 1 for analytic statements? Our author cannot 
even go that far out on a limb. Caplan’s theory is thus a recipe for radical skepticism. 
He might even doubt his own existence, for all we know; we doubt he would assign a 
probability to that claim of 1. 
  
7. Conclusions 
We believe this paper has conclusively demonstrated that Caplan’s 
methodological standpoint is caught in an insuperable predicament. It either does not 
meet the self-reference criterion, in which case his methodology fails to address the 
problem any respectable methodology should; or if it does, Caplan runs into the 
problem of further discounting his already merely probable first-order propositions of 
economics, in which case his certainty (be it psychological or epistemic) about them 
becomes even more unsustainable On the positive side, we suggest the methodology 
of Austrian economics, by being purely deductive, meets the self-reference 
requirement smoothly and is free from the probabilistic murkiness haunting the 
Caplanian position.  
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